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TRUSTS SPENDTHRIFr PROVISIONS INTER VIVOE 
TRANSFER OF GRANTOR-SPOUSE'S INTEREST IN TENANCY 
BY ENTIRETY AND SUBSEQUENT TESTAMENTARY CREA-
TION OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUST BY GRANTEE-SPOUSE IN 
FAVOR OF GRANTOR-SPOUSE HELD TO BE VALID AGAINST 
LATTER'S CREDITORS. WATTERSON v. EDGERLY, 40 Md. App. 
230, 388 A.2d 934 (1978). 
Maryland has long recognized spendthrift trust provisions by 
which a settlor may designate that the trust interest he creates be 
paid exclusively to the beneficiary, rendering the beneficiary's life 
estate inalienable by the beneficiary and protected from his 
creditors. 1 This results in an assignment of priority making the 
settlor's right to determine the recipient of his gratuitous conveyance 
superior to the right of creditors to have their debts satisfied out of 
their debtors' assets.2 In the recent case of Watterson v. Edgerly,3 the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals combined this inalienable 
characteristic of the spendthrift trust with the protection from 
1. See, e.g., Medwedeff v. Fisher, 179 Md. 192, 17 A.2d 141 (1941); Michaelson v. 
Sokolove, 169 Md. 529,182 A. 458 (1936); Johnson v. Stringer, 158 Md. 315,148 A. 
447 (1930); Plitt v. Yakel, 129 Md. 464, 99 A. 669 (1916); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 
v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 127 Md. 463, 96 A. 617 (1916); Jackson Square 
Loan & Say. Ass'n v. Bartlett, 95 Md. 661, 53 A. 426 (1902); Brown v. McGill, 87 
Md. 161, 39 A. 613 (1898). 
2. See, e.g, Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 725 (1875); Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 
A. 497 (1888) (dissenting opinion of Alvey, C.J., appears at 15 A. 92); E. 
GRISWOLD SPENDTHRIFI' TRUSTS § 29 (2d ed. 1947). 
Spendthrift trusts are a creation of American common law and were held 
invalid by English courts as unjustifiable restraints upon the alienation of 
property. See, e.g., Green v. Spicer, 1 R. & My. 395, 39 Eng. Rep. 153 (1830). This 
type of trust first appeared in Pennsylvania in the early nineteenth century, a 
time when the Pennsylvania courts habitually refused to recognize any equitable 
right of the creditor to reach the debtor/beneficiary's trust income. The United 
States Supreme Court, in dicta, later supported the position taken by the 
Pennsylvania courts. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 725 (1875). 
Not all jurisdictions in this country recognize spendthrift trusts. In many of 
the jurisdictions where they have been accepted, their effect has been limited by 
case decisions or legislative enactments. In Maryland, for example, a spendthrift 
provision will not prevent a wife or dependent of the spendthrift beneficiary from 
reaching the trust income for support or alimony. See, e.g., Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co. v. Robertson, 192 Md. 360, 65 A.2d 292 (1949). Nor will a spendthrift 
provision inhibit the attachment of a spendthrift beneficiary's income interest by 
the federal government in collection of the beneficiary's delinquent taxes. See, 
e.g., Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1944). The 
Restatement would expand the list of claimants who could reach a beneficiary's 
interest in a spendthrift trust to include suppliers of necessary services to the 
beneficiary and those whose services preserve or benefit the trust. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959). 
For a history of the American treatment of the spendthrift trust and its 
present operative effect within the various states, see generally G. BODGERT, THE 
LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 222-27 (rev. 2d ed. 1979); E. GRISWOLD 
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947). 
3. 40 Md. App. 230, 388 A.2d 934 (1978). 
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creditors afforded property held in a tenancy by the entirety. The 
court held that a husband faced with judgment creditors could 
convey his interest in real property held by the entirety to his wife, 
who in tum could validly create a testamentary spendthrift trust in 
favor of the husband in order to shield the husband's life estate from 
his creditors upon the wife's death. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On January 23, 1976, Earl Watterson was faced with several 
judgment creditors and, without consideration, he conveyed to his 
wife his interest in a parcel of real property held as tenants by the 
entirety. The next day Watterson's wife executed a will, establishing 
a spendthrift trust for the support of Watterson during his life. The 
trust corpus consisted partially of the real property conveyed by 
Watterson to his wife the day before. Sixty-one days later, Mrs. 
Watterson died. 
Edgerly, one of Watterson's judgment creditors, filed a bill of 
complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, requesting 
that the court declare the conveyance fro~ Watterson to his wife 
fraudulent as to Watterson's creditors, and the spendthrift provision 
of the trust invalid to the extent of Watterson's contribution to the 
trust corpus. Additionally, Edgerly sought a determination that 
Watterson's life interest in the trust was subject to execution by his 
creditors.4 
Based upon a stipulation of facts,5 the circuit court found 
Watterson's conveyance to his wife to be fraudulent as to his 
creditors,6 and determined that Watterson was, in effect, the settlor 
of the spendthrift trust created for his benefit. Finding the 
spendthrift provision invalid, the court held that Watterson's 
creditors could reach his interest under the trust. 7 
Although the stipulated facts contained no reference to Watter-
son's intent or knowledge at the time of the conveyance to his wife, 
the court found that Watterson was aware of his wife's terminal 
illness, and that this knowledge, coupled with Watterson's insol-
vency and the lack of consideration supporting the transfer, made 
4. Brief for Appellant, Watterson v. Edgerly, 40 Md. App. 230, 388 A.2d 934 (1978), 
Record Extract, E.3. 
5. Watterson v. Edgerly, 40 Md. App. 230, 233, 388 A.2d 934, 937 (1978). 
6. See, e.g., Ressmeyer v. Norwood, 117 Md. 320, 83 A. 347 (1912) (mortgage made 
from husband and wife to wife alone held invalid for want of bona fide 
consideration); Myers v. King, 42 Md. 65 (1875) (gift of $500 by insolvent 
husband to wife held fraudulent as to husband's creditors). 
7. Brief for Appellant, Watterson v. Edgerly, 40 Md. App. 230,388 A.2d 934, Record 
Extract, E.8. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959); G. 
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 223 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). 
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the conveyance an act "done with the intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud' creditors."8 From this adverse finding, Watterson sought 
appellate review in the Court of Special Appeals. 
II. THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS' OPINION 
The Court of Special Appeals preliminarily recognized the 
validity of spendthrift trusts9 and the accompanying prohibition 
against a person creating a spendthrift trust for his own benefit.lO 
Noting that the case was one of first impression, the court phrased 
the issue as "whether a husband may convey his interest in real 
property, owned by the husband and wife as tenants by the 
entireties, to his wife, and [whether] she in tum, by testamentary 
disposition, [may] create a valid spendthrift trust so as to shield the 
husband from his judgment creditors."ll 
After reviewing the facts, the court refused to accept the circuit 
court's conclusion that Watterson's intent in conveying his interest 
in the property was to hinder or defraud his creditors.12 Labeling this 
conclusion "a major premise of the trial court's reasoning,"13 the 
opinion discounted the importance of Watterson's intent. The court 
cited Hertz v. MilZs14 as permitting the transfer of property held by 
the entirety from either spouse to the sole ownership of the other, 
even if the transfer is motivated by an intent to "prevent the 
ellforcement of a judgment against the grantor should he survive the 
8. Brief for Appellant, Watterson v. Edgerly, 40 Md. App. 230, 388 A.2d 934 (1978), 
Record Extract, E.8. 
9. 40 Md. App. at 231, 388 A.2d at 935·36. See also Medwedeff v. Fisher, 179 Md. 
192, 17 A.2d 141 (1941); Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497 (1888) (dissenting 
opinion of Alvey, C. J., appears at· 15 A. 92). 
10. 40 Md. App. at 237, 388 A.2d at 936. The first indication of this prohibition 
against self-serving spendthrift trusts appeared in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 725 
(1875), in which the Supreme Court limited the establishment of testamentary 
spendthrift trusts to those created by a testator "who gives, without any 
pecuniary return, who gets nothing of property value from the donee." [d. at 727. 
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959); A. SCOTT, THE 
LAw OF TRUSTS § 156 (3d ed. 1967); see also Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 447, 58 A. 28 
(1904); Brown v. McGill, 87 Md. 161, 39 A. 613 (1898); Warren v. Rice, 66 Md. 436, 
8 A. 84 (1887). 
11. 40 Md. App. at 232, 388 A.2d at 936. 
12. [d. at 234, 388 A.2d at 937. 
13. [d. at 235, 388 A.2d at 938. 
14. 166 Md. 492, 171 A. 709 (1934). Hertz held that the judgment creditor of an 
individual spouse could not be deemed to have a right of execution on the 
entirety that was suspended during the life of the unencumbered spouse, bec811se 
any such valid but suspended right of execution would prevent the unencum-
bered spouse from passing good title. Thus, the judgment creditor of an 
individual spouse had no interest in the entirety and no standing to complain of 
its conveyance, even if such a conveyance acted to remove the debtor-spouse's 
interest from the creditor's future right of execution. See also Ades v. Caplan, 132 
Md. 66, 103 A. 94 (1918); Jordan v. Reynolds, 105 Md. 288, 66 A. 37 (1907). 
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grantee."15 Distinguishing the two Maryland cases cited by the trial 
court,16 which held interspousal transfers invalid if designed for the 
purpose of defrauding creditors, the opinion pointed out that neither 
of those cases involved the transfer of real property held in a 
tenancy by the entirety,l7 Emphasizing the absence of any 
Maryland precedent to the contrary, the court cited dicta in 
Maryland cases supporting the contention that no consideration is 
necessary to validate the transfer of property held by the entirety to 
the sole ownership of one spouse.1S 
The court briefly traced the history of 'tenancies by the entirety, 
reiterating that neither spouse can affect the tenancy by individual 
action,19 and that a judgment against either spouse does not give the 
judgment creditor an enforceable interest in the entirety.20 Citing a 
15. 40 Md. App. at 235, 388 A.2d at 938. Accord, Hertz v. Mills, 166 Md. 492, 171 A. 
709 (1934). The court also cited Van Royen v. Lacey, 266 Md. 649, 296 A.2d 426 
(1972), as support for this rule. In Van Royen the Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant-appellees were estopped by their pleadings from raising on appeal the 
contention that the land sought by a judgment creditor was partially held in a 
tenancy by the entireties. In dicta the Court of Appeals affirmed the Hertz 
holding. 266 Md. at 651, 296 A.2d at 427. 
16. See note 6 supra. 
17. 40 Md. App. at 236, 388 A.2d at 938. 
18. ld. at 235, 388 A.2d at 938. See also Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187, 28 A. 892 
(1894); Clark v. Wooton, 63 Md. 113 (1885). 
19. See, e.g., McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 37 A. 214 (1897). In McCubbin, a 
husband mortgaged land that was owned by the husband and wife as tenants by 
the entirety, upon which the purchaser of the mortgage attempted to foreclose. 
The court held that because one. tenant of the entirety could not alienate the 
property in a manner which would infringe the rights of the other tenant, the 
mortgage by the husband alone could not affect the property rights of his wife. 
The rationale for the decision in McCubbin is based upon the definition of the 
tenancy by the entirety found in Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 572-73, 48 A. 
1060, 1062 (1901): 
It is not because a conveyance or gift is made to husband and wife as 
joint tenants that the estate by entireties arises, but it is because a 
conveyance or gift is made to two persons who are husband and wife; 
and since, in contemplation of the common law, they are but one person, 
they take, and can only take, not by moieties, but the entirety. The 
marital relation, with its common law unity of two persons in one, gives 
rise to this peculiar estate when a conveyance or gift is made to them 
. without restrictive or qualifying words; and they hold as tenants by the 
entirety, not because they are declared to so hold, but because they are 
husband and wife. This estate, with its incidents, continues in Maryland 
as it existed at the common law. 
20. See, e.g., Jordan v. Reynolds, 105 Md. 228, 66 A. 37 (1907), in which a purchaser 
of land held by the entirety attempted to escape a contract of sale by arguing 
that an outstanding judgment against the husband destroyed the ability of the 
husband and the wife to convey a valid title free from any lien or judgment. The 
court concluded that the husband's judgment creditor had no lien upon the 
property and cited MD. CONST. art. III, § 43, which provides that "[t]he property 
of the wife shall be protected from the debts of her husband." In addition MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 45, § 1 (1971) provides similar statutory protection. See note 55 
infra. 
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Maryland statutory provision21 which protects a wife's property 
from the debts of her husband, the court stated that any interest in 
the entirety gained by a creditor would inhibit the ownership rights 
of the non-debtor spouse. In support of this position, the court cited 
G.LT. Corp. v. Flint,22 in which a husband and wife, shortly before 
the wife's death, jointly conveyed real property held by the entirety 
to a spendthrift trust for themselves. The husband's judgment 
creditors attacked the conveyance as fraudulent. The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania found that a judgment creditor of a husband or a 
wife had no standing to complain of a ,conveyance of the entirety, 
which "prevents the property from falling into his grasp."23 
The Court of Special Appeals, after finding that the transfer of 
the property from Watterson to his wife was a valid conveyance and 
that Edgerly had no standing to complain, rejected the lower court's 
finding that Watterson was a settlor of the trust created by his wife's 
will.24 The court inferred that the trial court's finding was due 
simply to the relatively short time period between the conveyance, 
the execution of the will, and the wife's death. 25 Reversing the trial 
court's judgment, the court noted that the creditor was in no worse a 
position than he would have been had Watterson predeceased his 
wife or if his wife had lived.26 
III. EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S OPINION 
After recognizing that Watterson v. Edgerly27 presented a 
question of first impression, the court devoted its opinion almost 
exclusively to reiterating the rationale of Hertz v. Mills 28 and the 
principle that a judgment creditor of an individual spouse cannot 
attack the conveyance of property held by the entirety.29 The 
decision also established for the first time in Maryland that the 
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 1 (1971). 
22. 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126 (1939). 
23. [d. at 354, 5 A.2d at 129. 
24. 40 Md. App. at 238, 388 A.2d at 939. 
25. The court stated as follows: 
[T]he law does not specify the time frame in which the conveyance may 
be made, nor does it permit a court to conclude, simply because the wife 
died within a relatively short period of time from the dates of the 
conveyance and execution of the will, that the husband is, in fact, the 
settlor of the trust. 
40 Md. App. at 238, 388 A.2d at 939. 
26. 40 Md. App. at 238, 388 A.2d at 939. The court alluded to the fact that if 
Watterson had predeceased his wife, the survivorship nature of the tenancy by 
the entirety would have passed the entirety to the sole ownership of the wife free 
from any claims of the husband's individual creditors. See McCubbin v. 
Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 37 A. 214 (1897). 
27. 40 Md. App. 230, 388 A.2d 934. 
28. 166 Md. 492, 171 A. 709 (1934). 
29. See note 14 supra. 
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subject matter of such a conveyance can become the corpus of a 
spendthrift trust for the grantor's benefit. This result was reached 
after only one sentence of discussion.30 If the creditor's attack upon 
the gratuitous conveyance of property held by the entirety from one 
spouse to the other had been based solely upon the law of fraudulent 
conveyances, the opinion would be more than sufficient because the 
court would not have had to consider the effect of the conveyance, 
only its legality. This was the case in C.LT. Corp. v. Flint,31 which 
the Maryland court cited to clarify its holding. In Flint, creditors 
sued under the Pennsylvania Fraudulent Conveyance Act32 to have 
a conveyance declared invalid. The Pennsylvania court held that the 
conveyance was not fraudulent, but pointed out "that it is to be 
borne in .mind that the legality of the deed does not determine its 
effect."33 In a subsequent action by the same creditor against the 
property of the trust, the Pennsylvania court held that the husband's 
life estate in the trust could be reached by his judgment creditors.34 
The court's rationale in the later action was that the husband was a 
settlor of the trust and therefore "the spendthrift provision must be 
held ineffectual."35 Flint has been interpreted as meaning that "the 
survivorship nature of the interest in a tenancy by the entirety may 
be sufficient reason for regarding the surviving spouse as the 
effective creator of the entire trust interest."36 
Although the Watterson court noted that a person cannot create 
a valid spendthrift trust for his own benefit,37 a rule followed by all 
jurisdictions recognizing spendthrift trusts,38 the court failed to 
investigate fully the possibility that Watterson had violated this 
established principle. It is universally recognized that a person may 
be the creator of a trust without being the named settlor,39 as where 
consideration is furnished to a third party for a conveyance to 
the trustee.40 If the person giving the consideration for such 
a conveyance is a beneficiary of the trust created, no spendthrift 
30. 40 Md. App. at 238, 338 A.2d at 939. 
31. 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126 (1939). 
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 351-63 (Purdon 1954). 
33. 333 Pa. at 355, 5 A.2d at 129 (emphasis added). 
34. Murphy v. C.I.T. Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 33 A.2d 16 (1943). 
35. ld. at 593, 33 A.2d at 18. 
36. E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 491.1 (2d ed. 1947). 
37. 40 Md. App. at 232, 388 A.2d at 936. See, e.g., Mauders v. Mercantile Trust & 
Deposit Co., 147 Md. 448, 128 A. 145 (1925); Brown v. McGill, 87 Md. 161,39 A. 
613 (1898). 
38. See generally A. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 156 (3d ed. 1967). The rationale for 
this prohibition is based upon the policy that a person should not be allowed the 
beneficial use of his property while it is held in trust beyond his creditors' reach. 
E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 491 (2d ed. 1947). 
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156, Comment f (1959). Accord, Security 
Trust Co. v. Sharp, 32 Del. Ch. 3, 77 A.2d 543 (1950). 
40. See generally E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 487 (2d ed. 1947). See, e.g., 
State v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 388, 190 S.W.2d 785 (1944). 
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provision will be effective to bar his creditors from reaching his 
interest in the trust.41 To determine what constitutes the giving of 
consideration for conveyance by another to a spendthrift trust, 
courts have developed several specialized rules.42 For example, 
paying off encumberances on trust property,43 surrendering curtesy 
or other marital property interests,44 or settling will contests and 
other legal disputes45 have been held to be acts furnishing 
consideration. Despite these specialized rules, however, no univer-
sally accepted test for determining what constitutes the giving of 
consideration has evolved from the long line of cases which have 
considered the issue.46 In Murphy v. C.l.T. Corp.,47 however, in 
which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with a joint 
conveyance of property held by the entirety to a spendthrift trust, 
the court found that the conveyance of the husband's interest in the 
entirety to the trustee was consideration for the establishment of the 
trust.48 The court so held despite the argument that it would be 
possible to find that the wife was the sole settlor of the spendthrift 
trust.49 
The facts of Murphy closely parallel the facts of Watterson, the 
only difference being that there was an initial conveyance from 
Watterson to his wife prior to her creation of the spendthrfit trust in 
his favor. 50 When Watterson conveyed his interest in the entirety to 
his wife, he surrendered his right of survivorship in the entirety.51 
This surrender of Watterson's right of survivorship could be viewed 
41. See, e.g., Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 447, 58 A. 28 (1904); Warren v. Rice, 66 Md. 
436, B A. 84 (1887). See generally G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§ 223 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). 
42. See generally 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 156 (3d ed. 1967). 
43. See Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 715 (1910). 
44. Compare Davis v. Davis, 138 Va. 682, 123 S.E. 538 (1924) (person electing to take 
a trust interest under a will instead of a right of dower held to have furnished 
consideration) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156, Comment f (1959) 
(no presumption should arise simply because a spouse waives "a right to insist 
on dower or curtesy or a statutory distributive share" of the deceased spouse's 
estate). . 
45. Johnson v. Stringer, 158 Md. 315, 148 A. 447 (1930). 
46. See generally Behrends, Liability Under Trusts to Creditors of Trustor, 30 So. 
CALIF. L. REV. 75 (1929); Note, Utility of Tests for Ascertaining the Settlor of an 
Express Trust, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 216 (1930). 
47. 347 Pa. 591, 33 A.2d 16 (1943). 
48. Id. at 593, 33 A.2d at 18. 
49. E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 491 (2d ed. 1947). 
50. In Murphy the husband and wife conveyed the entirety to a spendthrift trust by 
a joint act, and therefore there was no conveyance from the husband to the sole 
ownership of his wife. 
51. The survivorship nature of an estate held as a tenancy by the entirety is well 
established in Maryland. See, e.g., Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 572, 573, 48 A. 
1060, 1062-63 (1901). 
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as consideration for the establishment of the spendthrift trust. 52 
Without this conveyance by Watterson, the survivorship nature of 
the entirety would have passed sole ownership of the property to 
Watterson upon his wife's death. Therefore, without this conveyance, 
the wife's testamentary creation of the spendthrift trust would have 
been impossible. 
It has been suggested that courts should abandon the attempt to 
establish mechanical methods for determining the settlor of the 
spendthrift trust and "that it is more expedient to look merely at the 
issue in any given case and at the policy involved therein, with a 
view to ascertaining the one to be affected by the legal consequences 
ensuing from the adjudication of that issue alone."53 The policy 
considerations discussed in Watterson v. Edgerly focused primarily 
upon the property rights of the wife.54 The court correctly interpreted 
Maryland statutory law when it refused to formulate a holding that 
would affect the wife's ability to convey her interest in the entirety 
free from her husband's debts.55 The opposing policy consideration, 
however, that a person should not be allowed to derive income and 
benefit from assets he has placed beyond the reach of his creditors, 56 
was not discussed. If the Watterson court had followed the 
Pennsylvania court in Murphy, it could have protected the wife's 
property rights at the same time it protected the rights of the 
husband's creditors. The Maryland court, like the Pennsylvania 
court, could have held that the interspousal conveyance was valid 
and that the wife had every legal right to establish the testamentary 
trust, but that the trust spendthrift provision was invalid and that 
the husband's judgment creditors could reach his life interest in the 
52. Cf. E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFI' TRUSTS § 491.1 (2d ed. 1947) (This section 
analyzed the Pennsylvania court's holding in Murphy as meaning that the 
survivorship interest in a tenancy by the entirety is a property right and that the 
surrender or conveyance of this right may be deemed sufficient consideration for 
the creation of a trust. Thus the party surrendering a survivorship interest in an 
entirety may be regarded as the settlor of a spendthrift trust containing the 
property of the entirety.). 
53. Note, Utility of Tests for Ascertaining the Settlor of an Express Trust, 30 COLUM. 
L. REV 216, 225 (1930). 
54. 40 Md. App. at 366-67, 388 A.2d at 938-39. 
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 1 (1971) provides that "[t]he property, real and 
personal, belonging to a woman at the time of her marriage, and the property 
which she !llay acquire or receive after her marriage ... shall be protected from 
the debts of the husband, and not, in any way be liable for the payment thereof." 
For an application of the same statutory language, see Hertz v. Mills, 166 Md. 
492, 171 A. 709 (1934). 
Any interpretation of this statute which would allow a husband's creditor 
standing to complain about the conveyance of a tenancy by the entirety would 
inhibit the wife's ownership rights. If the creditor had standing, the wife would 
not be able to pass the title to her property free and clear of her husband's debts. 
See note 19 supra. 
56. See, e.g., Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 447, 58 A. 28 (1904); Warner v. Rice, 66 Md. 
436, 8 A. 84 (1887). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959). 
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estate. A judicial determination that a spendthrift prOVISIOn is 
invalid does not result in the destruction of the trust, but only in the 
destruction of the spendthrift provision. 57 Thus, if the spendthrift 
provision of Mrs. Watterson's will had been declared invalid, her 
disposition would have remained unchanged as to the remaindermen 
of the trust. 58 The only parties affected by such a holding would have 
been the husband, who would have been forced to pay his creditors, 
and the creditors, whose debts would have been at least partially 
satisfied. 
The effect of Watterson v. Edgerly is difficult to predict. It may 
be surmised that any spouse holding property by the entirety who 
faces individual judgment creditors will rush to convey his property 
interest in the entirety to the other spouse, with instructions to the 
transferee to create a will giving the transferor a trust interest 
protected by a spendthrift provision. This would be an attractive 
course of action for the indebted spouse because it would remove the 
possibility of the entirety passing to his sole ownership, without 
protection from his creditors, if the spouse who is free from debt 
predeceased him.59 Of course, this manuever would mean that the 
spouse making the transfer would surrender complete control and 
ownership to the other spouse, which might create hesitation in 
many potential transferors. Other considerations that might cause 
hesitancy would be the possibility of divorce, and that the transfer 
would strip the property of the protective aspects of the tenancy by 
the entirety and thus subject it to attachment by any future creditors 
of the transferee. Even recognizing these real and practical 
limitations upon the potential effect of the Watterson holding, 
however, it is foreseeable that a debtor spouse, who is faced with 
judgment creditors holding unsatisfied claims exceeding his interest 
in property held by the entirety, may decide to follow the route 
sanctioned by Watterson. Mter all, if divorce occurs, the protection 
57. See, e.g., Murphy v. C.I.T. Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 593, 33 A.2d 16, 18 (1943). See 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959). 
58. Mrs. Watterson's testamentary trust gave her husband only a life estate in the 
trust corpus. Upon her death an immediate, beneficial interest in the trust corpus 
became vested in the remaindermen with use and possession postponed until Mr. 
Watterson's death. Thus, the invalidation of the spendthrift provision would 
have meant that Watterson's creditors could attach only his life estate. Upon Mr. 
Watterson's death, his life estate would end and the remaindermen would take 
immediate possession of the trust corpus without personal encumbrances. 
This result was reached in Murphy v. C.I.T: Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 33 A.2d 16 
(1943), in which the creditors of the surviving spouse were permitted to reach 
only his life estate when he was determined to be the settlor of a spendthrift trust 
for his own benefit which gave the remainder ofthe trust estate to his daughters. 
59. Upon the death of either spouse, the survivorship nature of the tenancy by the 
entirety passes the entire estate to the sole ownership of the surviving spouse. 
See McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 390, 37 A. 214, 214 (1897). 
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of the tenancy by the entirety disappears60 and his creditors will 
execute upon his joint interest. If the recipient spouse fails to 
perform his agreement to create the testamentary spendthrift trust, 
the betrayed spouse can elect to take his intestate portion of the 
estate, and thus regain most of the 10ss.61 The only remaining 
danger to an indebted spouse in utilizing the Watterson holding 
would be an inter vivos conveyance by the spouse possessing sole 
ownership of the former entirety. This occurrence would merely 
accelerate the inevitable loss of the property that would occur upon 
divorce, or upon the death of the non-indebted spouse. 
When the preceding considerations are fully explored, it seems 
predictable that the holding in Watterson v. Edgerly will be 
employed to help married debtors evade their legally enforceable 
debts. Thus, spendthrift trusts in Maryland may be utilized in a 
manner which allows the settlor to enjoy the use and income of his 
own property during his lifetime to the exclusion of his judgment 
creditors. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Watterson v. Edgerly continues the Maryland 
tradition of holding a wife blameless for judgments rendered against 
her husband. It neglects, however, to consider the effect of providing 
a debtor-spouse with a method of avoiding judgment creditors that 
benefits no one but the debtor himself. The court should allow an 
incursion into a spouse's testamentary dispositive power when the 
incursion is limited to the equitable goal of reaching the surviving 
spouse's interest in order to ensure that a debtor-spouse does not 
enjoy his own property, while his judgment creditor is barred from 
executing upon the property. 
The sole justification of the spendthrift trust is that creditors of 
a spendthrift beneficiary have no rights superior to those of the trust 
settlor to dispose of his property as he sees fit. This justification 
disappears when the settlor is also a spendthrift beneficiary. In this 
60. Upon an absolute divorce the tenancy by the entirety ceases and the parties hold 
the estate as tenants in common. Thereafter the property interest of either spouse 
is subject to the claims of creditors. See Columbia Carbon Co. v. Knight, 207 Md. 
203, 210, 114 A.2d 28, 32 (1954) (dictum); Meyers v. East End Loan & Sav. Ass'n, 
139 Md. 609, 116 A. 453 (1922). 
61. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-102(b) (Supp. 1978). 
The remedy of specific performance would not be available to the damaged 
spouse because he would have to show that the conveyance of his interest in the 
entirety was the consideration he gave for the agreement he wishes enforced. See 
note 52 supra. Thus the spouse requesting specific performance would be forced 
to place himself in the position of the settlor of the trust in his pleading. This 
would result in the invalidation of the spendthrift provision and leave his 
interest in the trust open for execution by his creditors. 
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circumstance, the issue is no longer an assignment of priority 
between a gratuitous grantor and a creditor of the beneficiary, but is 
rather the assignment of priority between a debtor's interest in his 
property and a judgment creditor's right to have his judgment 
satisfied. Thus, when it is possible to trace the contribution of a 
person to the establishment of a spendthrift trust and to determine 
that the person is deriving a pecuniary benefit from the trust, the 
spendthrift provision should be held invalid and the interest of that 
person should be made available for execution by his judgment 
creditors. 
Richard C.B. Woods 
